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ABBREVIATIONS (*)
€:   Euro
AIAF  Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ABCP Asset-backed commercial paper
ATA  Average total assets
BCBS  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS  Bank for International Settlements
BLS  Bank Lending Survey
bn   Billions
bp   Basis points
CBE  Banco de España Circular
CBSO  Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR  Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDO  Collateralised debt obligation
CDS  Credit Default Swap
CEBS  Committee of European Banking Supervisors
CEIOPS  Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
CIs  Credit institutions
CNMV  Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS  Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DIs  Deposit institutions
EAD  Exposure at default
EBA Europena Banking Authority
ECB  European Central Bank
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESFS  European System of Financial Supervisors
ESRB  European Systemic Risk Board
EU  European Union
FASB  Financial Accounting Standards Board
FROB  Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSA  Financial Services Authority
FSAP  Financial Sector Assessment Program
FSB  Financial Stability Board
FSR  Financial Stability Report
FVC  Financial vehicle corporation
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
GDI  Gross disposable income
GDP  Gross domestic product
GVA  Gross value added
GVAmp  Gross value added at market prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board
ICO  Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID   Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs  International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
IOSCO  International Organization of Securities Commissions
ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association
LGD  Loss given default
LTV  Loan-to-value ratio (amount lent divided by the appraised value of the real estate used as collateral)
m   Millions
MiFID  Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs  Money market funds
NPISHs  Non-profit institutions serving households
OTC  Over the counter
PD  Probability of default
PER  Price earnings ratio
pp   Percentage points
ROA  Return on assets
ROE  Return on equity
(*) The latest version of the explanatory notes and of the glossary can be found in the November 2006 edition of 
the Financial Stability Report.
RWA  Risk-weighted assets
SCIs  Specialised credit institutions
SMEs  Small and medium-sized enterprises
SIV  Structured investment vehicle
SPV  Special purpose vehicle
TA   Total assets
TARP  Troubled Asset Relief Program
VaR  Value at risk
WTO  World Trade Organisation
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INTRODUCTION
From mid-2011 to November, tensions on euro area financial markets increased significantly. 
Accounting for these adverse developments was the interaction of the worsening and 
spreading of the sovereign debt crisis, the persistence of doubts over the situation of the 
European banking sector and the deteriorating macroeconomic context. Compounding 
this were the uncertainties associated with Greece’s situation and the possibility that a 
second bail-out programme could not be put together.
From December 2011 to March 2012 the tensions on financial markets eased. Contributing 
to this were the measures deployed in various areas. At the European level, at the Summit 
of Heads of State or Government on 9 December 2011, the foundations were laid for a new 
fiscal discipline and stability pact, and, at the same time, the legal framework to underpin 
the European Stability Mechanism was approved. Also in early December 2011, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) took a series of measures that contributed to easing tensions 
on financial markets, including most notably the provision of liquidity with full allotment at 
a fixed rate and at a term of three years in two auctions, the latter in late February 2012. 
Further, the activation of the second bail-out programme for Greece was a positive factor.
At the level of the Member States, too, measures were adopted in several spheres. In 
Spain, for example, notable fiscal measures were taken (including a reform of the 
Constitution so that all tiers of government should adhere to the principle of budgetary 
stability), a labour market reform was approved and the ongoing restructuring of the 
banking sector was furthered. In this latter instance, the measures introduced by Royal 
Decree-Law 2/2012 involve additional write-downs of the banking sector’s exposure to 
construction and real estate development assets, thereby raising their coverage levels 
with provisions and capital. This is the case, in particular, for those assets related to land 
and developments under construction, as their value was subject to greater levels of 
uncertainty as a result of the process of adjustment in the real estate sector. On 17 April 
the Banco de España approved the plans submitted by credit institutions to comply with the 
above-mentioned Royal Decree-Law.
Since late March 2012, tensions have rebounded on financial markets, compounded by an 
adverse macroeconomic environment. It is against this background that Spanish deposit 
institutions have been pursuing their activity. 
In these circumstances, credit to the private sector in Spain remained on a declining trend, 
which is largely due to the natural process of deleveraging by households and firms 
following the strong credit growth in the years prior to the crisis. Moreover, the course of 
credit can be explained by supply-side factors, due both to deposit institutions’ difficulties in 
obtaining funding on international financial markets and to macroeconomic developments 
that impair borrowers’ creditworthiness. Finally, the current economic juncture also limits 
the demand for funding by households and firms.
The weak economic circumstances help explain the fact that doubtful assets are growing, 
and that they will foreseeably continue to do so in a setting such as that described. However, 
the contribution of the construction and real estate development sector to the increase in 
doubtful assets remains to the fore, with that of the other sectors so far proving appreciably 
more moderate.
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As to the construction and real estate development sector, the February 2012 measures 
to bolster the Spanish banking sector will lead to coverage ratios with provisions of 60% 
for land-related assets, to which a further 20 pp will need to be added for additional 
capital requirements. For real estate under development, these percentages, considering 
the greater provisions and the capital surcharge required, will rise to 65%. That entails 
protection for institutions against falls in land prices of the order of 87%, of 82% for 
developments under construction, and of 56% for finished housing.
The easing of tensions on euro area financial markets from December 2011 to March 2012 
provided a window of opportunity. As has been the case throughout this crisis when such 
opportunities have arisen in the market, various Spanish institutions took advantage and 
issued debt on wholesale markets. This easing in tension between December and March, 
and especially the laxer liquidity tensions arising from the provision of funding by the ECB, 
have not translated into a relaxing of Spanish institutions’ stance, and greater provisions 
and capital have indeed been required of them. 
Retail deposits, following a continuous period of increases, have moved on a declining 
path in recent months, related essentially to the adverse macroeconomic setting (which 
has translated into a decline in saving and private-sector investment in financial assets) 
and to tougher competition with other saving products, non-bank (such as Treasury bills, 
the returns on which reached very high levels in late 2011) and bank (specifically promissory 
notes, which banks have marketed to individuals as substitutes for time deposits) alike. 
The profitability of Spanish deposit institutions remains subject to downward pressures 
exerted by factors already present in previous quarters, such as diminished activity and a 
narrowing of spreads between the return on assets and the cost of liabilities. In addition, 
pressure will also be placed on profits for this year by the greater provisioning requirements 
introduced by Royal Decree-Law 2/2012, and the weak macroeconomic setting will continue 
to exert an influence. The restructuring of the sector and its perceptible effect on reducing 
bank operating costs will, in the medium term, cushion these effects bearing down on profits.
In sum, tensions in the euro area eased from December to March. But since the end of that 
month they have increased anew on financial markets, while the risks linked to the 
weakness of economic growth persist. To restore financial markets’ confidence in the 
Spanish economy, it is crucial that the reform and balance-sheet clean-up agenda pursued 
in the recent period should continue. These measures contribute, moreover, to restoring 
the macroeconomic balance and competitiveness the Spanish economy needs to resume 
a sound growth path in the medium term, although some may exert something of a 
contractionary effect on the more immediate horizon. Significant measures have been 
taken along these lines in recent months in the financial realm (Royal Decree-Law 2/2012, 
which accelerates the bank balance-sheet clean-up process), in the fiscal area (reform of 
the Consitution and the Budgetary Stability Law, which contribute to improving the 
sustainability of public finances in the medium term, and public spending cuts in various 
areas) and in respect of structural reforms (most notably the labour market reform, which 
improves key aspects of the functioning of the labour market and promotes job creation in 
the medium term). All these measures will help boost long-term economic growth.
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1 MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
During the second half of last year, international financial developments continued to turn 
on tensions in European financial markets, which heightened from summer 2011 and took 
on a systemic nature. This turbulence spread to other areas through two channels: first, 
through a flight to quality, reflected in the appreciation of the dollar and in the decline in 
yields on US, UK and German government debt; and further, through an increase in the 
uncertainty surrounding the financial institutions exposed to the euro area, which led to 
increases in risk premia and falls in stock market values.
From December to March, tensions on European financial markets tended to ease. 
Contributing to this were the measures deployed in various spheres over recent months. At 
the Summit of Heads of State or Government on 9 December the foundations were laid for 
a new fiscal discipline and stability pact, and the legal framework that will govern the 
functioning of the European Stability Mechanism was approved. Further, fiscal, structural-
policy and financial measures were adopted in several countries. In Spain, approval was 
given to a labour market reform and to the deepening of the financial system clean-up, 
recapitalisation and restructuring process, along with other structural reforms. At its 
November and December meetings, the ECB cut its official interest rates from 1.5% to 1% 
and, at the same time, adopted further, non-conventional temporary measures. These 
included coordinated action with other central banks to provide liquidity in foreign currency, 
the lowering of the reserve requirement from 2% to 1% and, essentially, the provision of 
three-year liquidity with full allotment at the auctions held in December and February for an 
amount close to €1 trillion, whose effects on tensions proved significant. These new 
auctions were also accompanied by an extension of the range of eligible assets.
In early March, Greece launched the operation involving private-sector participation in the 
restructuring of its debt, whereby private creditors agreed to an exchange of assets 
entailing a 53.5% face value haircut. The agreement was most extensively subscribed to, 
although the Greek government had to implement collective action clauses. That led to the 
deal being considered as a credit event by the ISDA, triggering CDSs, while the rating 
agencies considered it as a selective default. The successful culmination of this operation 
enabled the second financial assistance programme for Greece to be activated, thereby 
eliminating one of the sources of uncertainty affecting financial markets.
During this period there were also other significant sources of concern, although they bore 
down less on the markets than those arising from the euro area sovereign debt crisis. 
Notable among these risks were those associated with the revised growth outlook in 
certain areas, the need to increase fiscal consolidation in advanced countries, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, and the potential consequences of sustained 
growth in oil prices, which are already at high levels, insofar as these might have second-
round effects jeopardising inflation targets or in terms of the transfer of income involved 
from importing to exporting countries. In addition, the implementation of certain domestic 
regulations with a notable extra-territorial impact prompted some concern over the degree 
of international coordination in terms of regulatory roll-out. Other persistent problems, 
such as the US housing market situation, continue to give rise to numerous doubts, despite 
efforts by the authorities to support mortgage securitisations and the fact that at the end 
of last year it was made known that an agreement had been reached to improve foreclosure 
processes and compensate households affected by practices arising from these situations.
The euro area sovereign debt 
crisis continued to be the main 
factor bearing on international 
financial developments during 
the second half of 2011
From December to March, 
tensions on European financial 
markets eased, thanks to 
certain measures adopted by 
the European authorities, the 
Member States and, above all, 
the ECB…
… and the successful 
culmination of the operation 
involving private-sector 
participation in the 
restructuring of Greek debt, 
which allowed the second aid 
programme for Greece to be 
launched
During this period other 
sources of uncertainty over 
the international financial 
context arose or remained in 
place
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The failure of some of the extreme risks envisaged to materialise, action by the main 
central banks, which have provided high levels of liquidity, and some optimism concerning 
the figures for economic activity and, in particular, employment in the United States 
contributed to improving agents’ confidence. In addition, the stress tests on several US 
banks and the release of better-than-expected results for Q1 contributed to shoring up 
confidence in the US financial sector. These developments prompted a rise on most 
international stock market indices and there was an increase in the appetite for risk seen, 
inter alia, in the high volume of bond issues by companies with a low credit rating and in 
the rise in capital flows towards emerging countries.
In the euro area financial markets, sovereign debt yield spreads narrowed from November 
to March in most countries, particularly in Italy and Spain. The risk premia on securities 
issued by financial institutions also fell and stock market indices rallied (see Chart 1.1). 
Banks’ access to wholesale funding also improved, as testified by the rise in fixed-income 
issues both by Spanish institutions and by those of other countries. 
However, from late March tensions renewed on European financial markets, focusing 
particularly on Spain and Italy, which led to a rise in risk premia. In the case of Spanish 
10-year government bonds, the yield briefly breached the 6% mark and the spread over 
The measures deployed 
contributed to improving 
market confidence and the 
appetite for risk
The reflection of this in the 
euro area was an improvement 
in financial conditions
But since late March there 
have been renewed tensions 
on financial markets
SOURCE: Datastream.
a Euro area: 5-year iTraxx Europe Senior Financials. United States and United Kingdom: average 5-year CDS for commercial banks. Latest data: 19 April 2012. 
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the German benchmark exceeded 440 bp, levels not seen since last November (see Chart 
1.1). Stock markets in the euro area, and to a lesser extent in other areas, have been 
affected by this fresh bout of instability, and indices have fallen back considerably.
During this period the emerging economies continued to show significant resilience. 
However, the increase in global risk aversion in the second half of 2011 combined with the 
sluggishness of external demand and the lagged effect of these countries’ restrictive 
economic policies led to less favourable developments in activity and non-financial markets, 
with capital inflows falling off. Against this backdrop, the gradual slowdown in activity in 
these economies continued. These effects were more marked in the emerging European 
economies, with much closer trade and financial links to the euro area. At the other extreme 
was, once again, the notable resilience of Chinese economic growth, although it has not 
been immune to the global situation and is slowing somewhat. Inflation rates also tended 
to ease in the second half of 2011 and early 2012, though they remained relatively high. In 
this setting of economic deceleration and lower inflation, some central banks tended to 
ease their monetary policy stance during the second half of the year and, above all, at the 
onset of 2012. Also in the opening months of the year, the emerging markets benefited from 
the greater appetite for risk and fresh capital inflows, which prompted upward pressures on 
exchange rates and, in some cases, monetary policy and macroprudential responses.
After a certain rise in activity in the developed economies in 2011 Q3 (thanks in part to the 
pick-up in the global production chains affected by the Japanese earthquake in March and 
to the stabilisation of commodities prices), Q4 saw a notable divergence between economic 
developments in the United States —where the growth rate continued to increase and the 
labour market showed some signs of a clear improvement— and the rest of the main 
advanced economies, such as Japan and the United Kingdom, which posted quarterly 
declines in GDP. Nonetheless, there were signs of stabilisation in early 2012, as the high-
frequency indicators of activity and confidence rose. However, economic recovery in these 
economies is expected to remain weak, in a setting in which there will be less headroom to 
pursue policies to stimulate growth and to correct the imbalances built up in the expansionary 
phase. Inflation rates in the advanced economies peaked at the end of 2011 Q3 and, 
thereafter, gradually fell, against a background of economic sluggishness and with 
commodities prices easing from their spring 2011 peak. However, these prices have 
rebounded in early 2012, especially in the case of oil, as a result of demand by the emerging 
economies and of specific supply-side factors, such as the geopolitical tensions in Iran.
In the euro area, economic activity slowed in the second half of 2011, as a result of the 
diminishing dynamism of world demand, the ongoing adjustment of private-sector balance 
sheets, fiscal consolidation plans and the tensions on sovereign debt markets. GDP thus fell 
by 0.3% in the final quarter of the year, although in year-on-year terms it increased by 0.7% 
(see Chart 1.2.A). The medium-term outlook has also worsened, as reflected by the downward 
revisions to economic growth by most analysts and international organisations. Specifically, 
the ECB’s March projections show GDP in a range of between -0.5% and 0.3% for 2012, and 
between 0% and 2.2% for 2013, meaning lower rates than those in the December projection 
exercise. The indicators for 2012 Q1 suggest economic activity is stabilising at a low level.
In Spain, GDP posted a quarter-on-quarter decline of 0.3% in Q4, compared with a rate 
of 0% in the three previous months, while the year-on-year rate was 0.3% (see Chart 
1.2.A). Against this background, the pace of job destruction stepped up in the closing 
months of 2011 to 3.3% year-on-year, with the unemployment rate standing at close to 
23% at the end of the year (see Chart 1.2.B). The figures available for the opening months 
Economic activity in the 
emerging economies moved 
on a gradual slowing path, 
albeit posting relatively high 
rates
In contrast, the developed 
economies, with the exception 
of the United States, slowed 
once more
Euro area GDP contracted in 
2011 Q4, and the short and 
medium-term growth outlook 
was revised downwards. 
Preliminary figures for 2012 
Q1 point to GDP stabilising at 
a low level
In Spain, GDP contracted in 
Q4 and job destruction 
accelerated. The preliminary 
data available suggest a 
continuation of these trends
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of 2012 suggest a continuation of the contractionary pattern of economic activity. The 
latest projections by leading institutional and private-sector analysts, which are shrouded 
in great uncertainty, show a significant decline in GDP for 2012 and a moderate recovery 
for 2013.
The slow process of deleveraging continues in the private sector, with liabilities posting 
negative growth rates that are in part countered by the decline in economic activity and the 
scant increase in income, which means that households and firms both remain subject to 
a high degree of financial pressure, as evidenced by the increase in doubtful asset ratios. 
In the case of households, the difficulties derived from high unemployment are accentuated 
by the ongoing decline in their net wealth, as a result of the fall in real-estate and financial 
asset prices. The information available on business profits (based on the sample of the 
firms reporting to the quarterly Central Balance Sheet Data Office survey) reveals a marked 
deterioration during 2011, which led to declines in profitability ratios.
In the case of general government, financing requirements remain at high levels, meaning 
that debt continues to post high growth rates (13.8% in annual terms in February), far 
outpacing the growth of economic activity. That has translated into further increases in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio (68.5% of GDP in December), and especially in the debt burden (2.5% 
of GDP, compared with 2.3% in June), which has also been affected by the increase in 
interest rates as a result of financial market tensions.
In sum, following the pick-up in the situation on financial markets from December to 
March, there has been renewed financial turbulence in the euro area, focusing particularly 
on Spain and Italy. Against this background of greater tensions, the increase in liquidity 
obtained by Spanish banks from the Eurosystem’s three-year tenders provides a significant 
buffer that lessens the refinancing risks these banks face. Other risks persist, moreover, 
particularly those linked to the weakness of economic growth.
The slow ongoing 
deleveraging of the private 
sector in Spain continues, 
while household wealth, like 
business profits, has 
continued to fall…
… while the general 
government debt and debt 
burden continue to grow in 
terms of GDP
Liquidity risks have lessened, 
but other risks persist, 
particularly those linked to the 
weakness of economic growth
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates.
b Year-on-year rates.
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
B. YEAR-ON-YEAR EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE. 
EPA DATA 
  
% 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
EURO AREA (a) SPAIN (a) EURO AREA (b) SPAIN (b) 
A. YEAR-ON-YEAR AND QUARTER-ON-QUARTER 
GDP GROWTH 
  
% 
GDP AND EMPLOYMENT CHART 1.2
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, APRIL 2012
2  DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER FINANCIAL MARKET PARTICIPANTS
In recent months, new reforms have been undertaken in Spain in the fiscal area, including 
a constitutional amendment requiring all the regional governments to adapt their activities 
to the principle of budgetary stability, and in the labour market, among others. In addition, 
further measures have been taken in relation to the banking sector.
As regards the measures taken in relation to the Spanish banking sector, February 2012 
saw the approval of RDL 2/2012, which aims to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the 
valuation on banks’ balance sheets of assets connected with construction and real estate 
development, and in particular that associated with assets relating to land and developments 
under construction. Despite these new measures to clean up banks’ balance sheets, the 
environment in which Spanish banks have to operate remains difficult, given that wholesale 
funding markets have yet to return to normal. Moreover, the macroeconomic situation in 
Spain remains adverse, as reflected in the increase in tensions on financial markets since 
the end of March this year, following their fall between December 2011 and March 2012. 
The consolidated balance sheet for all deposit institutions, which includes their activity in 
Spain and that of their subsidiaries abroad, shows a growth rate of 3% in December 2011 
in relation to the same period of the previous year (see Table 2.1). Total assets thus amounted 
to €3,901 billion at the end of last year.
Financing to the private sector, understood as credit and fixed income, fell by 1% in 
December 2011 with respect to December 2010 (see Table 2.1), owing to the declines in 
both fixed-income securities and in credit to the private sector. The determinants of the 
developments in this variable relate to the macroeconomic environment, which has 
negatively affected the credit quality of bank customers, leading banks to raise their 
credit standards. Another element of downward pressure on the supply side was the 
tensions on funding markets which, while having been partially relieved by the measures 
approved by the ECB in December 2011, had an impact on the ability of banks to offer 
financing to customers. The weakness of the economic situation also results in lower 
demand for funds by firms and households, which adds to a more structural development, 
namely the reduction in the borrowing that these sectors have been undertaking to correct 
the imbalances built up during the upswing.
Financing to general government (credit and fixed income) increased by 12% relative to 
December 2010, its weight in the consolidated balance sheet increasing from 9.4% in 
December 2010 to 10.2% in December 2011. In recent months the weight of credit and 
fixed income of Spanish general government in Spanish banks’ business in Spain has 
grown (see Chart 2.1.A), a trend that persisted in January 2012, when the financing to 
Spain’s general government reached 9.4% of the total assets of business in Spain. This 
trend can be expected to go into reverse when the downward trend in credit to the 
resident private sector does. In any case, taking a longer perspective, and subject to the 
caveats applicable to the analysis of this type of trend, while the weight of financing to 
Spanish general government in the banking sector’s business in Spain has increased in 
recent years, it is still far below the level seen in the mid-1990s (see Chart 2.1.A). 
Compared with other EU countries, Spanish banks’ government debt holdings are in line 
with the average for the European banking sector.
2.1  Deposit institutions
2.1.1  BANKING RISK
Measures have been 
taken at the European 
level and by various 
countries, including Spain
In the Spanish banking sector 
additional measures have 
been taken to write down the 
real estate assets of banks 
whose balance sheet value is 
subject to most uncertainty
The consolidated balance 
sheet shows modest growth…
…and the fall in financing to 
the private sector continues
Financing to Spain’s general 
government increases, but its 
weight in the sector’s balance 
sheet is significantly lower 
than in the past
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The total doubtful assets ratio1 at the consolidated level stood at 5.1% in December 2011, 
as against 4.5% in June 2011 and 4.1% a year earlier. As is analysed in greater detail 
below, with regard to business in Spain, additional increases in doubtful assets are to be 
expected in the next few quarters given the macroeconomic scenario for 2012.
Doubtful assets grow and 
so too does the doubtful 
assets ratio
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
b Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. March 2012 data.
c Difference calculated in bp.
Dec-11
Change
Dec-11/Dec-10
Relative weight
Dec-10
Relative weight
Dec-11
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 154,065 25 3.2 3.9
Loans and advances to credit institutions 195,259 -9 5.7 5.0
General government 101,019 13 2.4 2.6
Other private sectors 2,369,482 -1 62.9 60.7
Debt securities 495,759 2 12.8 12.7
Other equity instruments 44,879 -27 1.6 1.2
Investments 53,602 9 1.3 1.4
Derivatives 240,769 37 4.6 6.2
Tangible assets 50,963 2 1.3 1.3
Other (a) 195,140 24 4.1 5.0
TOTAL ASSETS 3,900,936 3 100 100
    MEMORANDUM ITEMS
    Financing to private sector 2,485,840 -1 66.3 63.7
    Financing to general government 398,986 12 9.4 10.2
    Total doubtful assets 160,083 24 3.4 4.1
    Total doubtful assets ratio 5.1 99 (c)
    Provisions for bad debts and country risk -90,734 6 -2.2 -2.3
Dec-11
Change
Dec-11/Dec-10
Relative weight
Dec-10
Relative weight
Dec-11
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 207,312 118 2.5 5.3
Deposits from credit institutions 467,776 -7 13.2 12.0
General government 89,278 -8 2.5 2.3
Other private sectors 1,771,690 -2 47.9 45.4
Marketable debt securities 525,523 -4 14.4 13.5
Derivatives 223,509 38 4.3 5.7
Subordinated debt 89,818 -15 2.8 2.3
Provisions for pensions, tax and other 32,265 -10 0.9 0.8
Other (a) 261,570 23 5.6 6.7
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,668,741 3 94.2 94.0
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
    Eurosystem net lending (b) 227,600 1.1 5.8
Minority interests 24,218 0.4 0.6
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity -11,417 -0.1 -0.3
Own funds 219,394 5.5 5.6
TOTAL EQUITY 232,195 6 5.8 6.0
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 3,900,936 3 100 100
Assets
LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET. 
DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS 
TABLE 2.1
1  Total doubtful assets include, in addition to those of the resident private sector, which are analysed in greater 
detail below, those of general government, credit institutions and fixed-income securities on banks’ consolidated 
balance sheets.
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The increase in the derivatives item on the assets side is offset by a similar increase on the 
liabilities side, and largely reflects hedging operations carried out by some deposit 
institutions. The assets heading “other” includes elements that are not explicitly detailed 
in the table. Its increase stems from several of these, in particular “stocks” and “non-
current assets held for sale”, reflecting asset foreclosure processes.
On the liabilities side, there was a notable increase in central bank deposits, which grew 
by 118% in December 2011 relative to the same period of 2010. Net borrowing from the 
Eurosystem in March 2012 amounts to 5.8% of the total balance sheet in December 
2011. The increase in the recourse to ECB financing reflects the increase in tensions 
in financial markets in the euro area. These tensions led the ECB to adopt measures in 
December 2011 (see Box 2.2), and in particular to announce two unlimited three-year 
refinancing operations.
The tensions on the wholesale funding markets are reflected in marketable debt securities, 
which are falling, their weight in the balance sheet remaining on a downward trend. 
Subordinated debt is falling more sharply, partly owing to the loss of attractiveness of an 
instrument that, for the purposes of capital regulation, is not counted in the most demanding 
ratios, these being the ones that have recently received greater attention both from the 
markets and from regulators and supervisors.
Other private sectors show in December 2011 a year-on-year fall, at the consolidated 
level, of 2%. As analysed below for business in Spain, this decline is explained both by 
the slackness of the macroeconomic environment, and by the competition from other 
financial instruments.
As in the case of assets, the liabilities heading “other” includes those items not explicitly 
detailed in Table 2.1. Its increase is mostly explained by the increase in repos.
Own funds grew by 5% in December 2011 relative to the same period of the previous year, 
their relative weight in the balance sheet amounting to 5.6%, while equity, relative to 
assets, increases to 6% from 5.8%.
The uptake of financing from 
the Eurosystem increases, 
under the measures adopted 
in December 2011
The weight of own funds in 
total assets increases
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The distribution of the external financial assets of Spanish deposit institutions shows the 
relative importance of traditional areas of expansion, such as Mexico and Brazil, and of other 
more recent ones, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States (see Chart 2.1.B). 
The relative importance of exposure to other geographic areas, including other European 
countries, is quantitatively more limited. From the viewpoint of the valuation of the risks implied 
by these exposures, it should be taken into account that irrespective of the area the exposures 
are to, they are generally exposures of subsidiaries that carry out their activity in the countries 
concerned with financial autonomy, that the activity is mostly local and denominated in local 
currency, and that they do not relate to loans made by the parent entity in Spain.
Credit to the resident private sector in Spain, according to individual financial statement 
data, shows a year-on-year decline of 3.8% in December 2011 (see Chart 2.2.A). The 
latest data, relating to February 2012, show a decline in this variable of 4.0%. The trend 
observed during 2011, after credit returned to slightly positive levels or very modest falls 
at the end of 2010, is thus intensifying (see Chart 2.2.A). This behaviour of credit is sector 
wide; with just the odd exception all the institutions have been showing negative rates of 
The external exposure of 
Spanish banks is 
geographically diversified and 
has been assumed by 
financially autonomous 
subsidiaries
Credit to the resident private 
sector in Spain falls…
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The shaded area represents the institutions´ dispersion between the 10th and the 90th percentiles for changes in credit. 
b Corporation size is proxied by the volume of bank debt reported to the Banco de España Central Credit Register.
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change recently, although there continues to be a notable dispersion in the rates at which 
this variable is falling (see Chart 2.2.A).
The fall in credit stems from demand-side factors; demand is less strong owing to the 
weakness of the economic situation, and also partly due to the necessary deleveraging by 
households and non-financial corporations. This process should be carried out in an 
orderly fashion and be focused on those sectors in which the largest imbalances were 
concentrated during the pre-crisis years, in particular the construction and real estate 
development sector. It is also consistent with an intensification of supply restrictions, for 
two reasons. First, the poorer macroeconomic outlook is having a negative impact on the 
credit quality of potential borrowers. Second, banks’ funding difficulties intensified very 
significantly (not only in Spain), although they eased thanks to the measures taken by the 
ECB from December last year. The new measures approved by the government, which are 
incorporated in RDL 2/2012, introduce further incentives for those assets most closely 
related to such imbalances to be taken off banks’ balance sheets (see Box 2.1). In any 
event, credit cannot be expected to pick up during the next few months.
Lending to individuals fell by 2.9% in December 2011 relative to the same period of 2010. 
The rate of decline is especially strong in the case of lending for purposes other than house 
purchase (–8.8% in December 2011 with respect to December 2010), although this rate has 
stabilised somewhat at around these levels (see Chart 2.2.B). Lending to individuals for 
house purchase fell by 1.6% in December 2011 year-on-year. This rate is well below the one 
mentioned above for other lending to households, but the recent rate of decline is notable.
As regards non-financial corporations, the rate of decline of credit (–5.7% in December 2011 
with respect to December 2010) is basically explained by the reduction in credit to construction 
and real estate development firms (–7.8% in December 2011, year-on-year). For other non-
financial corporations the decline is more moderate (–3.7% in December 2011), although 
broadly based across sectors (see Chart 2.2.C). The broad-based nature of the decline in 
credit is also apparent when firms are considered according to their size, measured in terms 
of the volume of bank debt reported to the Banco de España Central Credit Register.
Doubtful assets arising from credit to the resident private sector in business in Spain grew 
at a rate of 32% in December 2011 in relation to the same period a year earlier. The rise in 
the rate of increase in doubtful assets dates back to the final quarter of 2010 (see Chart 
2.3.A), and is basically explained by the increase in doubtful assets associated with the 
construction and real estate development sector (see Chart 2.3.B). The doubtful assets 
arising from credit to households and other business sectors have been growing during 
2011, although their contribution to the volume of new doubtful assets is limited. Thus, of the 
total increase in doubtful assets last year, 23.5% is attributable to non-financial firms other 
than those in the construction and real estate development sector and 5.6% to households.
The increase in doubtful assets and the progressive reduction in credit result in a substantial 
increase in the doubtful assets ratio, which in December 2011 reached 8%, as against 
5.8% a year earlier (see Chart 2.3.C). The February data put the ratio at just above 8%, 
close to the peak recorded in 1993 (8.5%; see Chart 2.3.D). However, when construction 
and real estate development is excluded, the doubtful assets ratio stands at significantly 
more moderate levels (4.2% in December 2011).
The construction and real estate development sector has a significantly higher doubtful 
assets ratio (20.9% in December 2011, as against 13.5% in December 2010). Moreover, 
…owing to both demand and 
supply factors
The reduction in credit is seen 
both for individuals…
…and non-financial 
corporations, the fall in this 
case being concentrated in 
the construction and real 
estate development sector
The increase in doubtful 
assets largely stems from 
those originating in credit to 
construction and real estate 
development…
…which has a significantly 
higher doubtful assets ratio…
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when not only doubtful assets are included, but also foreclosures and substandard 
assets, the troubled assets associated with real estate development amount to 60% (see 
Box 2.1).
In mid-2010 the Banco de España increased its transparency requirements for institutions in 
relation to their real estate exposures. However, amid the climate of greater deterioration 
in the macroeconomic and financial environment in Spain and in the euro area in the 
second half of 2011, there was a worsening of the impact on bank balance sheets of the 
uncertainty surrounding the value of assets related to the construction and real estate 
development sector, and in particular surrounding land and developments in progress, for 
which no sufficiently active market exists. This led to approval of a new set of measures to 
clean up the sector´s balance sheets (see Box 2.1).
One of the areas that arouses most interest in the market, regarding the Spanish financial 
sector, is its exposure to the construction and real estate development sector, as well as 
to financing for house purchase and the volume of assets acquired in payment of debt. 
Thus, in order to strengthen and improve the reporting of exposure to the real estate sector 
required by the Banco de España, Circular 5/2011 was published on 30 November 2011. 
This Circular requires more transparency in the semi-annual and annual reporting, and also 
includes a requirement for confidential information, with the aim of achieving a harmonised 
and comparable breakdown and presentation of the quantitative information so reported.
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Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 2/2012, approved ten weeks after the 
new Government came into power, introduces new measures to 
write down assets related to the construction and real estate 
development sector with the aim of strengthening the credibility 
of, and confidence in, the Spanish banking system. This clean-up 
has been focused on land and developments in progress in 
particular, since these are the assets whose value is subject to 
most uncertainty, owing to the absence of sufficiently deep 
markets, in terms of volume and importance of transactions.
In mid-2010, the Banco de España amended its provisioning rules, 
in order to increase the level of institutions’ provisions and also to 
generate incentives for these assets to be taken off banks’ balance 
sheets. In 2011, to give greater visibility and full transparency to 
the process, institutions were required to publish extensive details 
of their real estate exposures. However, these measures have not 
been sufficient to eliminate the uncertainty regarding the value of 
assets related to the real estate sector, in particular land, against a 
background of ongoing adjustment in this sector and a sharp 
deterioration in the macro-financial conditions in the euro area, 
especially in the second half of 2011.
The new measures apply to the total volume of troubled assets of 
the construction and real estate development sector as at 31 
December 2011. Troubled assets are deemed to be doubtful 
loans (due to late payment or other reasons), sub-performing 
loans and foreclosed assets. These assets totalled €184 billion in 
December 2011, amounting to 60% of the whole construction 
and development portfolio, which has a total value of €308 billion 
(see Chart A). This percentage of assets recognised as impaired 
is very significant.
New core capital and provisioning requirements
These new write-downs are carried out through three elements: 
specific provisions, capital surcharges and provisions for normal 
investment:
– Specific provisions: additional specific provisions are 
established to cover the losses incurred on portfolios of 
troubled assets. Without going into all the details specified in 
RDL 2/2012, the additional provisions required by this rule 
arise from five sources. First, the provisions for all assets 
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Thus, the total amount of provisions and core capital that institutions 
are required to set aside is €53,842 million. This comes on top of the 
efforts institutions have made to clean up their balance sheets since 
2008, which have involved a total write-down of €112 billion.
Of the the total number of institutions and groups of credit 
institutions, 90 have notified the Banco de España that they 
already met the new requirements as at 31 March 2012. The other 
45 have communicated their plans, according to which compliance 
will basically be achieved through the use of general provisions 
amounting to €4 billion, the retention of earnings for the year and 
capital contributions estimated at €12.5 billion, taking into account 
that many institutions have more than enough “core capital”. Two 
institutions have notified their intention to participate in integration 
processes with two other institutions to meet the new requirements. 
In the case of the three institutions controlled by the FROB (Banco 
de Valencia, Catalunya Banc and NCG Banco), the balance sheet 
restructuring will involve the entry of new shareholders through a 
process of sale in accordance with the provisions of RDL 9/2009 
of 26 June 2009.
As established by RDL 2/2012, institutions must cover the new 
requirements during the course of this year, except in those cases 
in which merger processes are to be carried out this year. Thus, 
when mergers between institutions are planned, a deadline of 31 
May is established for submitting the plan, which requires the 
approval of the Ministry for Economic Affairs. When the plan has 
been approved, the Ministry having one month in which to make a 
decision, the institution then has 12 months in which to comply 
with the requirements of RDL 2/2012 and the integration process 
must be completed by 1 January 2013.
RDL 2/2012 lays down certain conditions for mergers (the minimum 
size of the resulting institution, corporate governance improvements, 
targets for the financing of households and SMEs, targets for 
reducing exposure to construction and real estate development, 
etc.) and authorises the FROB, where necessary, to contribute 
securities convertible into shares within 5 years.
The plans notified to the Banco de España envisage another five 
takeover or merger processes involving eleven institutions, which 
are at various different stages. Twelve credit cooperatives may also 
participate in integration operations, which does not necessarily 
imply that they are availing themselves of the special merger regime 
of RDL 2/2012 described above.
By means of Circular 2/2012, the Banco de España made the legal 
changes envisaged in the Royal Decree-Law to adapt the 
requirements in relation to provisions to Circular 4/2004 on public 
and confidential reporting rules.
Conclusions
– In short, RDL 2/2012 establishes strict additional requirements 
to increase the write-downs of Spanish banks on their 
related to land must be raised to 60% of book value. Second, 
for assets related to developments in progress, the level of 
provisions must be raised to 50%, except for developments in 
progress classified as sub-performing, in which case the 
coverage must be 24% (the volume of assets in this situation 
is estimated to be around €2 billion). Third, for foreclosed 
assets in the form of completed developments and other 
collateral the value of coverage ratios is increased to 50% and 
they are extended to a fourth year. Four, for foreclosed 
dwellings of households the requirement for coverage is 
extended to a fourth year with a ratio of 40%. And fifth, for the 
other loans to this sector the minimum provision for doubtful 
assets is established as 25% of the gross value of the loan and 
the coverage percentage is raised for operations classified as 
sub-performing from 10% to 20% or 24%, depending on 
whether they are collateralised.
– Capital surcharge: this is required for troubled assets related 
to land and developments in progress, and the reason for it is 
that there is greater uncertainty over their value owing to the 
absence of a market and significant transactions. The 
surcharge is established in such a way that the coverage of 
the assets related to land is raised from 60% to 80%, and for 
developments in progress from 50% to 65%. It hinges on the 
regulatory requirement for core capital in force in Spain since 
the approval of RDL 2/2011.
– For the standard construction and real estate development 
portfolio a requirement is established to set aside, in addition to 
the general provision, a one-off independent provision of 7% of 
the outstanding amount as at 31 December 2011 of all financing 
relating to land for real estate development and to construction 
or real estate developments classified as standard. 
The amount so calculated can only be used to cover the needs 
arising from subsequent reclassifications of the loans that serve as 
the basis for the estimation, or from the receipt of assets in payment 
of such loans.
The application of the first two elements described above involves a 
very significant increase in the coverage for the total troubled portfolio 
(from 29% to 53%), in particular for developments in progress 
(from 28% to 65%) and for land (from 33% to 80%, see Chart B). 
Taking into consideration the average LTVs of both portfolios, 
these levels of coverage would be compatible with falls in the 
initial values of land and developments in progress of 82% and 
87%, respectively (see Chart C).
On 17 April 2011, the Banco de España, meeting the first deadline 
established by RDL 2/2012, concluded the process of approval of 
the plans of the institutions or groups of institutions, which had been 
submitted by 31 March. In total, the institutions have notified a need 
for further provisions of €29,077 million, in addition to the €9,192 
million already set aside before the end of 2011. Additional core capital 
requirements of €15,573 million must be added to these amounts.
BOX 2.1NEW MEASURES TO CLEAN UP FINANCIAL SECTOR BALANCE SHEETS APPROVED  
BY ROYAL DECREE-LAW 2/2012 (cont.)
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Other lending to non-financial corporations shows a rising, but more moderate doubtful 
assets ratio (6% in December 2011, as against 4.5% a year earlier). Excluding larger firms, 
identified by the volume of their bank debt in the CCR, the doubtful assets ratio is, to date, 
relatively similar across the different types of firm (see Charts 2.4.A and B).
In the case of credit to individuals, the doubtful assets ratio was 3.4% in December 2011, 
as against 3% a year earlier (see Chart 2.3.C). Notable differences persist in the level of the 
ratio according to the purpose of the credit. Thus, for credit for purposes other than house 
purchase, the doubtful assets ratio is 6.8% in December 2011. For credit to individuals for 
house purchase, which accounts for 84% of total credit to individuals, the doubtful assets 
ratio was 2.8% in December 2011. Although it has increased with respect to December 
2010 (2.3%), the rise has been moderate.
…than other non-financial 
corporations…
…and individuals
NEW MEASURES TO CLEAN UP FINANCIAL SECTOR BALANCE SHEETS APPROVED  
BY ROYAL DECREE-LAW 2/2012 (cont.)
BOX 2.1
exposures to the construction and real estate development 
sector and, in particular, for assets related to land and work in 
progress. These assets do not have a sufficiently active 
market establishing reference prices, so that their true value is 
subject to some uncertainty. RDL 2/2012 helps to eliminate 
this uncertainty, by requiring provisions to be made (of 80% 
for land and 65% for work in progress) that are compatible 
with falls in the value of land and work in progress of 87% and 
82%, respectively.
– The plans approved by the Banco de España show that the new 
provisions, have in most cases been made already, or will be 
made without great difficulty, despite the significant impact on 
the income statement. In other cases compliance is expected to 
be more difficult, so that the BE intends to step up its vigilance 
and has required additional contingency measures to improve 
the chances of success. However, if any institution, owing to the 
significant restructuring and recapitalisation efforts, ultimately 
fails to achieve the required level of core capital, on its own or 
through participation in an integration process, it may apply to 
the FROB for the assistance provided for.
The Banco de España has indicated on various occasions that 
asset foreclosure is a normal mechanism for dealing with 
collateralised assets that have become classified as troubled. 
However, this process must be temporary, so that institutions can 
focus on their basic activity, namely attracting savings to channel 
towards productive activities.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Corporation size is proxied by the volume of bank debt reported to the Banco de España Central Credit Register.
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In a macroeconomic scenario like the current one, with forecasts of significant year-on-year 
falls in GDP and unemployment rates of around 24%, one can expect the doubtful assets ratio 
in the case of credit to individuals for house purchase to rise. However, this increase should 
be moderated by certain characteristics of the retail mortgage market in Spain, specifically the 
importance of owner occupied housing, the legal framework and the banking model pursed 
by Spanish institutions, with the marketing of more risky mortgage products and services 
(buy-to-let mortgages or mortgages to finance consumer goods) being uncommon. Mindful 
of the limitations of historical comparisons, it may be noted that in 1993 the doubtful asset 
ratio for this segment of the credit portfolio reached 4% (see Chart 2.3.D). At that time the 
unemployment rate stood at 24%, and interest rates were at around 14%, well above the 
mortgage rates prevailing today, although debt was lower and exit from the crisis was faster.
The second half of 2011, and in particular the final quarter of the year, was characterised 
by a notable resurgence of financial tensions in the euro area, driven by various factors 
that interacted with one another, notably the worsening and extension of the sovereign 
debt crisis, the uncertainty surrounding the banking sector and the deterioration of the 
macroeconomic outlook. These renewed tensions were apparent in various financial 
indicators, and in particular in the widening of euro area country debt spreads (see 
Charts 2.5.A and B).
The worsening and spreading of the problems led to a summit of Heads of State or Government 
on 26 October 2011, which resolved to act in three areas. First, a solution for Greece was 
agreed, including the voluntary acceptance by the private sector of a nominal discount on 
notional Greek debt of around 50%. Second, an expansion of the Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) was agreed. And third, a programme to recapitalise the larger banks was designed, 
which included a requirement for core Tier 1 capital of 9% and for capital to cover the potential 
losses on European Economic Area sovereign debt portfolios.
In spite of these agreements, tensions persisted in the euro area financial markets (see 
Charts 2.5.A and B), the medium and long-term primary wholesale funding markets 
remaining practically closed, while severe tensions persisted in the short-term ones. 
The financial tensions 
in the euro area…
…led to the adoption 
of different measures by 
the authorities
... including those 
adopted by the Eurosystem 
in December 2011
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Thus, at the beginning of December 2011, the ECB announced a series of measures (see 
Box 2.2), notable being the approval of two three-year refinancing operations to be 
conducted through a fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment, in addition to those 
adopted at the European level at the Summit of Heads of State or Government of 
9 December and those approved by various countries in the areas of fiscal consolidation 
and structural reform. On top of all this came the second Greek rescue programme. 
All these decisions and measures, and in particular those agreed by the ECB, contributed 
notably to easing tensions (see Chart 2.5.B). In the first few months of the year there was 
a new window of opportunity for issuance on primary funding markets, which had in 
preceding months been practically closed to most euro area financial institutions. Spanish 
institutions, as in the past when windows of opportunity of this type have opened in the 
markets, issued debt in the first three months of the year. Although the amount of issuance 
varied from one institution to another, a total of €12.7 billion of debt was placed, of which 
somewhat more than half was in the form of mortgage covered bonds (see Chart 2.6.A). 
However, since March tensions have reappeared on financial markets, which despite their 
improvement have remained highly volatile. 
This set of measures eased 
the tensions and a number of 
European institutions, 
including various Spanish 
ones, issued debt in the first 
few months of 2012, although 
tensions have reappeared on 
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Eurosystem’s credit operations. In this respect, in order to increase 
collateral availability the credit rating threshold for certain asset-
backed securities was reduced. Also, as a temporary solution, 
national central banks (NCBs) were allowed to accept as collateral 
additional performing credit claims that satisfy specific eligibility 
criteria. Subsequently, in February 2012, the national frameworks 
proposed by the central banks of Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, 
Cyprus, Austria and Portugal were approved. To date, the use of 
these additional bank loans as collateral by institutions residents 
in Spain has been very limited. In late March, the loans included in 
this category accounted for barely 0.24% of the total volume of 
assets deposited as collateral.
Lastly, measures have also been taken in the context of liquidity 
support in foreign currency, against a background of bouts of 
tension in short-term foreign currency funding markets. In 
November 2011, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the 
Bank of Japan, the ECB, the Federal Reserve System and the 
Swiss National Bank announced an agreement to lower the pricing 
on the existing temporary US dollar liquidity swap arrangements. 
Further, the authorisation of these swap arrangements was 
extended to February 2013, and it was agreed to establish 
temporary bilateral liquidity swap arrangements so that liquidity 
could be provided in each jurisdiction in any of their currencies 
where necessary. Against this background, the Eurosystem has 
continued to regularly conduct liquidity-providing operations in 
dollars, with maturities of one week and three months, through the 
fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment.
Given the persistence of the European sovereign debt crisis, the 
Eurosystem has adopted various measures in recent months in 
an attempt to counter its adverse effects on funding markets. 
Thus, in addition to cutting its official interest rates in November 
and December 2011, it has launched measures to correct market 
malfunctioning and smooth European credit institutions’ access 
to funding.
Specifically, in December 2011 the ECB Governing Council decided, 
first, to conduct two longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) 
with a maturity of 36 months and the option of early repayment after 
one year.1 These operations took place in December 2011 and 
February 2012 as fixed-rate tender procedures with full allotment, 
with the interest rate fixed at the average rate of the main refinancing 
operations (MROs) over the life of the respective operation. Further, 
it decided to discontinue the fine-tuning operations conducted on 
the last day of each reserve maintenance period. As to other 
operations, it has retained the use of the fixed-rate procedure with 
full allotment both for MROs and for maintenance period operations. 
Refinancing operations with a maturity of three months have 
continued to be conducted through the fixed-rate full allotment 
procedure, where the rate is the average rate of the MROs over the 
life of the respective three-month operation.
Furthermore, the reserve ratio was reduced from 2% to 1%. In the 
current context of excess liquidity, apparent in the extensive use of 
the deposit facility, it is possible to reduce reserve requirements to 
control money market conditions.
Also included in the batch of measures approved in December 
2011 were changes relating to collateral eligibility criteria for the 
BOX 2.2RECENT EUROSYSTEM MEASURES
1  These operations replaced the longer-term refinancing operation with a 
maturity of twelve months that had been announced in October 2011.
The persistence of distrust prompted by the sovereign debt crisis and the additional 
excess liquidity generated by the new longer-term Eurosystem operations (see Box 2.2) 
have kept the level of activity on the interbank markets relatively stable, at levels below 
those recorded in previous years. Chart 2.6.B shows the volume of Eonia trading. It can be 
seen how, following the notable declines in the middle months of 2011, trading edged up 
in the final quarter of the year and has remained at similar levels since. In the Spanish 
interbank market, neither the unsecured segment (the one most affected by the crisis), nor 
the repo segment saw notable changes during this period.
The absence of a recovery in the interbank markets and, especially, the provision of 
additional long-term liquidity by the Eurosystem (two intimately interrelated phenomena) 
have led to a considerable increase in the overall recourse to Eurosystem liquidity by 
European deposit institutions. In the specific case of Spanish institutions, this increase in 
recourse to Eurosystem funds has been more pronounced than for the euro area as a 
whole, since Spain is one of the countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis. 
Chart 2.6.B shows developments in the outstanding amount of funding provided through 
ECB tenders, both for the Eurosystem as a whole and for institutions resident in Spain. In 
fact, from end-September 2011 until the second half of April 2012 (a period in which both 
the two three-year liquidity providing operations were recorded) institutions resident in 
The difficulties persist in euro 
area money markets…
…resulting in an increase in 
ECB financing in the context 
of the two unlimited three-year 
fixed-rate refinancing 
operations
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Spain increased their gross recourse to the Eurosystem by €236,584 million, while the 
increase in the outstanding amount of funding for the Eurosystem as a whole amounted 
to €557,017 million. The increase in funds allotted by the Eurosystem to institutions 
resident in Spain was concentrated in the new three-year operations, which, apart from 
generating new demand, displaced most of the amounts that had previously been applied 
for at shorter maturities (see Chart 2.6.C). Institutions have used these Eurosystem funds 
to repay large amounts of medium and long-term debt, to reduce funding through central 
counterparty clearing houses and to acquire highly liquid bonds, placing the surplus in 
the ECB’s deposit facility. In their recourse to Eurosystem financing, the use as collateral 
by Spanish institutions of bank loans within national frameworks has so far been very 
limited (0.3%; see Box 2.2).2
The consequence of the increase in borrowing from the Eurosystem by institutions resident 
in Spain is that lending to such institutions as a percentage of total Eurosystem lending 
increased considerably during this period. Chart 2.6.D shows the volume allotted in 
tenders to institutions resident in Spain relative to total Eurosystem lending. As can be 
seen, the percentage allotted to institutions resident in Spain has increased with respect 
to 2011 Q3 levels. In March 2012 the average level was 28%.
The deposits of private sector non-financial firms and households resident in Spain raised 
by Spanish deposit institutions, following months of uninterrupted expansion, have been 
displaying a downward trend since June 2011. Since October 2011, the rates of change 
in this variable have been negative (see Chart 2.7.A), which continues to be the case 
according to the most recent data available (–2.4% in January 2012 relative to January 
2011). The slowdown in the rate of growth of retail deposits commenced when the 
financial tensions associated with the euro area sovereign debt crisis increased. Although 
these tensions affected the euro area as a whole, they were especially severe in Spain.
Such tensions led to a very sharp increase in the return on public debt, which competes 
with bank deposits. At the end of 2011, yields on 12-month Treasury bills reached around 
5%, although they fell very significantly in first few months of 2012 (to 1.9% in February). 
The sharp increase in the yield spread between Treasury bills and time deposits (see 
Chart 2.7.B) makes the former more attractive relative to the latter.
The attractiveness of public debt vis-à-vis bank deposits was also strengthened by the 
impact of the entry into force of RDL 771/2011, which tends to restrict the interest rates 
offered by institutions on their deposits.3 Additional contributions to the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund are required by those institutions that pay interest on time deposits or current 
accounts above certain threshold rates.
Against this background of fierce competition for savings, some institutions opted to 
market other products to attract the savings of non-financial firms and households. In 
particular, promissory notes, which are not subject to the aforementioned rate restrictions, 
since they are securities and are not covered by the Deposit Guarantee Fund, have 
increased sharply in recent months (see Chart 2.7.C), absorbing part of retail deposits. 
When promissory notes are included, deposits show a more moderate rate of change 
(see Chart 2.7.D).
As a consequence of all this, 
lending to Spanish institutions 
has increased as a percentage 
of total Eurosystem lending
Following months of 
uninterrupted expansion, the 
deposits of households and 
non-financial firms in Spain 
are growing at negative rates 
…
…due to a shift in savings to 
other instruments
2  Among the measures approved by the ECB in December 2011 is the one that refers to national central banks 
accepting performing bank loans that satisfy specific eligibility criteria as collateral. Spain, like other countries, 
approved its national framework in February 2012 (see Box 2.2).
3 RDL 771/2011 links the contributions of institutions to the Deposit Guarantee Fund to the risks they assume.
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Finally, a further factor that may have partly contributed to the recent decline in retail 
deposits is the increase in investment in this type of instrument in the rest of the world 
by the resident private sector, basically firms and, presumably, multinational companies 
in particular, whose treasury decisions are linked to global group strategies. Between 
July and December 2011, the volume of this investment was equivalent to around 15% 
of the decline in the retail deposits held by households and firms with resident credit 
institutions.
The consolidated profit recorded by the banking sector was 63.5% lower in 2011 than in 
2010 (see Table 2.2). The return on assets (ROA) in December 2011 was 0.17%, compared 
with 0.47% a year earlier. This sharp downward trend was also seen in the return on equity 
(ROE), which decreased by 5.1 pp to 2.9% between December 2010 and December 2011.
This notable decrease in consolidated income for the year is explained by various factors, 
the foremost of which are weak net interest income and higher impairment losses. The fall 
in profit, although across-the-board, differed markedly among institutions, as shown by 
the dispersion of ROE (see Chart 2.8.A). What is more, the data for the aggregate of deposit 
institutions, which, as stated above, reflect a decline in profit of 63.5%, include the losses 
posted by some Spanish institutions in 2011, particularly those incurred by certain 
institutions in which the FROB had a majority holding.
2.1.2 PROFITABILITY
The consolidated net income 
of Spanish deposit institutions 
decreased sharply in 2011 
compared with 2010
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Net interest income decreased by 3.4% in 2011 with respect to 2010. In terms of ATA, this 
represents a drop of 11 bp to 1.74% in December 2011. If the Spanish institutions with a 
high international presence are excluded from the analysis, the absolute value of net interest 
income shows a sharper fall (-15.3% year-on-year), as this item also does expressed as a 
proportion of average total assets (down by 22 bp to 1.06%).
Net interest income continues to come under pressure from various factors, including the 
downward trend in the spread between the average rates on assets and liabilities, the 
progressive decline in business volume and the changes in the asset/liability structure. 
These factors caused financial costs to increase sharply in December 2011 in year-on-year 
terms (32%), as compared with a more moderate rise in financial revenue (12.9% in the 
same period).
The factors exerting downward pressure on net interest income are perceptible in 
business in Spain. If the change in net interest income is broken down into three factors 
(changes in yield spread, changes in business volume and changes in asset/liability 
structure), it is seen that the fall in net interest income between December 2010 and 
December 2011 is mostly due to a narrowing of the yield spread (see Chart 2.8.B). 
However, this component lost ground in 2011 relative to 2010 as a factor explaining the 
decrease in net interest income, since the spread between the average return on assets 
and the average cost of liabilities steadied during 2011 (see Chart 2.8.C). This development 
is partly explained by the behaviour of the net interest spread on new business, which, 
The downward pressure on 
net interest income 
continues…
…due to the behaviour of the 
net interest spread, the 
weaker activity and the 
volume of doubtful assets, 
which earn no interest
Dec-10 Dec-11
€m
% Change
Jun-11/Jun-10
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 137,249 12.9 3.43 3.76
Financial costs 73,893 32.0 1.58 2.03
Net interest income 63,357 -3.4 1.85 1.74
Return from capital instruments 2,155 -9.8 0.07 0.06
Share of pro?t or loss of entities accounted for using the equity method 3,617 -2.3 0.10 0.10
Net commissions 23,591 3.9 0.64 0.65
Gains and losses on ?nancial assets and liabilities 6,691 -32.2 0.28 0.18
Other operating income -1,193 . -0.01 -0.03
Gross income 98,218 -5.4 2.93 2.69
Operating expenses 50,560 3.9 1.37 1.39
Net operating income 47,658 -13.6 1.56 1.31
Asset impairment losses (speci?c and general provisions) 29,378 11.4 0.74 0.81
Provisioning expense (net) 3,847 -17.2 0.13 0.11
Operating pro?t 14,434 -40.2 0.68 0.40
Asset impairment losses (assets other than loans and credits) 11,175 127.6 0.14 0.31
Income from disposals (net) 3,672 4.6 0.10 0.10
Pro?t before tax 6,930 -69.5 0.64 0.19
Net income 7,732 -58.8 0.53 0.21
MEMORANDUM ITEM
    Income attributable to the controlling entity 6,110 -63.5 0.47 0.17
Dec-11
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT 
Deposit institutions 
TABLE 2.2
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after decreasing until June 2010, subsequently reached a higher level (see Chart 2.8.D). 
Thus, despite the decrease in net interest income for the overall portfolio, the average 
spread steadied, and, notably, that on new business has been widening in recent months.
However, although the measures adopted by the ECB have helped to alleviate medium- 
and long-term euro area financial market tensions, it cannot be ruled out that in the coming 
quarters net interest income may come under downward pressure due to developments in 
financial costs. The other two factors contributing (to very similar extents) to the fall in net 
interest income in business in Spain between 2010 and 2011 are falls in business volume 
and negative effects on the asset/liability structure.
Commissions increased by 3.9% in 2011 compared with December 2010. The various 
components of commission revenue grew commensurately, although the total is basically 
explained by those relating to collection and payment services and by the marketing of 
non-bank financial products, due to their greater relative importance within total 
commissions. In any event, the increase in commissions, and the slight rise in the profits 
of entities accounted for using the equity method did not offset the fall in return on equity 
instruments (–9.8%) and in gains on financial transactions (–32.2%). Accordingly, gross 
income decreased by 5.4% year-on-year (24 bp in terms of ATA, to 2.7%).
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Marginal interest rates are those established in transactions initiated or renewed during the month prior to that of reference, such transactions being weighted by 
their volume. The assets-weighted marginal rates include, inter alia, those applied to housing and consumer ?nance and cred???????????nancial corporations, while 
the liabilities-weighted ones include, inter alia, ?xed-term deposits and repos.  
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Operating expenses grew by 3.9% in December 2011 with respect to the same period of 
the previous year. This increase is seen both in personnel expenses (up 3.9% in December 
2011 year-on-year) and in administrative expenses (up 4.9%), while depreciation and 
amortisation expenses remained practically unchanged. This increase in operating 
expenses, along with the fall in gross income, meant that the efficiency ratio worsened 
from 46.9% in December 2010 to 51.5% in December 2011.
In total business at consolidated level, the behaviour of operating expenses is strongly 
affected by the Spanish institutions with a higher presence abroad, both because they have 
changed their scope of consolidation to some extent and because their investment process 
is not uniform across the different geographical areas. Excluding from our analysis the 
institutions with a larger international presence, operating expenses decreased by 3.8% 
between December 2010 and December 2011. This is consistent with the progressive 
reduction of employees and offices in business in Spain from the peaks reached in mid-
2008 (see Charts 2.9.A and 2.9.B). In any event, given that these institutions suffered the 
most severe contraction of gross income, in line with the higher fall in net interest income, 
their efficiency ratio worsened much more sharply, deteriorating from 52.6% in December 
2010 to 61.5% in December 2011.
Asset impairment losses, which reflect specific and general provisions, grew by 11.4% in 
December 2011 with respect to December 2010. This increase in impairment losses in 2011 
is also apparent in terms of average total assets, with a rise from 0.6% in the first quarter of 
the year to 0.8% in December (see Chart 2.10.A). This development stems from a number 
of factors, some of which are of an individual nature in that they are due to large increases 
in this item at specific institutions, some of whose impairment losses jumped significantly 
in the past quarter, owing partly to early application of subsequent regulatory changes. 
Others are more general, since there was a relatively widespread rise among institutions, 
particularly in the fourth quarter of 2011, as a result of the aforementioned worsening in 
doubtful assets and of a possible step-up in the recognition of real estate portfolio 
impairment. The fact that the general trend is upward in 2011 Q4 is reflected in the behaviour 
of the median of the ratio of impairment losses to average total assets, while the individual 
situations of institutions have been putting upward pressure on this ratio for the sector as a 
whole (see Chart 2.10.A).
Other impairment losses, i.e. for assets other than loans and receivables, grew much more 
sharply in 2011 with respect to the same period of 2010 (128%). This is due, firstly, to the 
Operating expenses 
moderated…
…and the number of bank 
offices and employees in 
Spain continued to decline
Asset impairment 
losses grew…
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higher provisions associated with foreclosures, a phenomenon extending to all institutions 
but particularly marked in certain ones, and, secondly, to goodwill impairment at some 
foreign subsidiaries of Spanish institutions.
In any event, impairment losses, whether they be on loans and receivables or on other 
types of assets, and even taking into account that the December 2011 figure reflects 
upward influence from the individual situations of certain institutions, show a growing 
trend which is progressively eroding an increasingly large percentage of institutions’ 
operating income (see Chart 2.10.B), which in turn is subject to downward pressure from 
the aforementioned factors acting on net interest income. It cannot be ruled out that 2012 
will see an increase in impairment losses, due to the behaviour of doubtful assets in the 
current economic setting and to the application of Royal Decree-Law 2/2012.
As a result of all the above, profit before tax decreased by 69.5% between December 2010 
and December 2011 to €7,732 million in December 2011 (see Table 2.2). Twenty 
consolidated groups posted losses totalling somewhat more than €8,170 million. The tax 
effects of these losses, taken together with others at the consolidated groups posting 
…and reduced operating 
income by a considerable 
percentage
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profits (91 groups), gave rise to accrued corporate income tax for accounting purposes of 
the total consolidated groups for 2011 as a whole which resulted in €800 million higher 
profit after tax than before tax.
The financial tensions in 2011, along with the misgivings about the situation of financial 
institutions in a weaker macroeconomic setting, led to a fall in their stock market prices 
(see Chart 2.11.A). Nevertheless, Spanish institutions occupy an intermediate position 
with respect to comparable European institutions.
Comparison of the stock market value of institutions with their book value shows that, 
save some exceptions (basically Nordic and Swiss institutions), the main European 
institutions are subject to notable pressure (see Chart 2.11.B). Spanish institutions are in 
an intermediate situation, although they exhibit a certain heterogeneity, derived partly from 
their business model and partly from the quality of their assets.
The solvency ratio of Spanish deposit institutions ended the year with a gain of 57 bp, 
standing at 12.4% at end-2011 (see Chart 2.12.A). In twelve months the tier 1 ratio rose 
from 9.6% to 10.6%. The rise in solvency ratios was concentrated in the increase in higher-
quality capital. Royal Decree-Law 2/2011, enacted in February 2011, raised capital 
requirements for institutions in two ways: creating a new own funds requirement based on 
capital principal (hereafter referred to as “core capital”, since it is similar to core capital as 
defined in Basel III for application in 2013), and raising capital levels to 8% for all institutions 
and, in certain cases, to 10%. Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 specified that these capital levels 
had to be reached by 30 September 2011. In December 2011, according to the first 
disclosure by deposit institutions under the new regulation, this core capital ratio stood at 
9.8%, although it varied somewhat across institutions (see Chart 2.12.B).
Total own funds decreased by 0.19% year-on-year in 2011, 3.5 pp more than the change 
in 2010. The more severe core capital requirements accelerated the expansion of tier 1 
capital, the growth of which, at 4.1%, was higher than the rate of 3.6% in the previous 
year. This strengthening of capital took place at the expense of lower quality capital, which 
decreased by 19.3% on top of the fall of 17.1% in 2010.
The market-to-book value 
of European institutions is 
under strong downward 
pressure, with Spanish 
institutions standing in 
an intermediate position
2.1.3 SOLVENCY
The solvency ratio increased…
…because of the rise in higher 
quality capital
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Non-parametric estimation of the density function, which provides a continuous and smoothed graphic representation of such function. As it is based on the 
number of institutions, they all have the same weight in the distribution without the larger ones having a heavier weighting. A shift rightwards in the distribution 
denotes an improvement in solvency. 
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Under the more exacting requirements for higher quality capital stemming from Royal 
Decree-Law 2/2011, tier 1 capital has continued to grow as a result of the higher capital 
(24.6%). Meanwhile, intangible assets decelerated, although they continued to grow at a 
rate of 4.3% (see Chart 2.13.C).
Tier 2 capital fell further, showing a decline of 19.3% as all its components contracted (see 
Chart 2.13.D). Most notable in this respect is subordinated debt (the largest component of 
tier 2 capital with a weight of 78%), which decreased by 18.4% at a time when markets 
and regulators/supervisors are focussing on higher quality capital, for which subordinated 
debt is not eligible. Meanwhile, the general provisions eligible to be counted as own funds 
(with a weight of 16%) fell by 20.2% because they shrank as a result of the ongoing rise in 
specific provisions.
As a result of the European Banking Authority’s recapitalisation scheme agreed at the 
summit of euro area Heads of State or Government on 26 October 2011, institutions will 
have to hold a temporary capital buffer, which will derive from two sources. First, the 
Spanish institutions have 
leverage levels below those 
of their European peers
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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marking-to-market of government debt instruments; and second, the raising of the minimum 
capital requirement to a core tier 1 level of 9%, in accordance with the definition adopted 
by the EBA. Five Spanish institutions participated in this exercise. They were found to need 
capital of €26 bn, which has to be provided by 30 June 2012. These requirements arise 
largely from applying the EBA’s definition, which disregards national specificities as it seeks 
a standard definition for all countries. At present, Spanish institutions have covered all 
these additional capital needs derived from the EBA exercise.
The solvency position of institutions depends also on the denominator of the ratio, i.e. on 
risk-weighted assets. An intense debate is currently under way in this respect and various 
international teams within the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the EBA are 
working to analyse the differences between institutions in the different countries and reach 
a consensus on standardisation (see Charts 2.14.A and 2.14.B).
Spanish insurance companies recorded an increase of 4.13%4 in the volume of premiums 
issued in 2011 with respect to 2010. This growth in premiums for the sector as a whole 
masks uneven performances by the life segment, where they grew by 9.5%, and the non-
life segment, where they decreased by 0.28%. Within the non-life segment, performance 
was also uneven across the various types of insurance, although generally the more 
expansionary lines were not as buoyant as the life segment. Thus, the volume of premiums 
increased by 3.34% in multirisk insurance and by 3% in health insurance. By contrast, 
2.2  OTHER FINANCIAL 
MARKET 
PARTICIPANTS
Life insurance premiums grew 
and non-life premiums 
decreased slightly
SOURCE: Financial reports of the banks in question.
a The biggest banks in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom are taken. Each panel depicts the banks in 
descending order for the variable in question. 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
BIGGEST EUROPEAN BANKS BIGGEST SPANISH BANKS 
A. RWA AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS. DECEMBER 2011  
  
SOLVENCY OF THE BIGGEST EUROPEAN BANKS (a) CHART 2.14
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
BIGGEST EUROPEAN BANKS BIGGEST SPANISH BANKS 
B. SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ASSETS. DECEMBER 2011   
  
4  ICEA data.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, APRIL 2012
the business volume of automobile insurance declined (premiums down by 2.3%), as did 
that of the other non-life lines (–3%).
From the standpoint of the solvency of the insurance sector as a whole, the data relating 
to December 2011 show that the solvency margin is slightly over 260%, i.e. around 2.6 
times the legal minimum. Segmental analysis shows that the solvency margin is significantly 
higher in the non-life segment (353%) than in the life segment (189%).
The European insurance sector faces different risk factors which put pressure on its 
profitability and solvency. These factors are also apparent to varying extents in Spanish 
companies, depending on their characteristics. The insurance segments hardest hit by the 
adverse macroeconomic situation are those whose results or business volume depend 
most on the business cycle.
The insurance sector is also unfavourably affected by the strain in the financial markets, 
particularly that relating to sovereign debt, which insurance companies hold on their 
balance sheets.
Regarding the financial market situation, the prolonged period of low interest rates also 
adds to the pressure on insurance companies. This risk is higher insofar as the maturities 
of assets and liabilities are less well matched.
The tension and uncertainty in financial markets, plus the intense competition of investment 
funds with other savings products of a bank (e.g. deposits and promissory notes) or non-
bank (e.g. Treasury bills) nature, has led to a progressive loss of investment fund assets 
(see Chart 2.15.A). This is seen in the adverse trend in net subscriptions (negative from 
2011 Q2), which has been only partly offset by sporadic gains in yields in some months. 
Meanwhile, pension funds show greater stability in their assets, as would be expected 
given their nature (see Chart 2.15.B).
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3  OTHER MATTERS
The international financial crisis has shown the need for improving, among other things, 
different aspects of credit institution regulation and supervision. This chapter of the FSR 
analyses two topics in this respect. First, from a more global perspective, it looks at the 
necessary process of convergence in accounting legislation between the US and the EU; 
and second, within the confines of Europe, the work of the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) in macro-prudential regulation and supervision.
International accounting convergence
Since the onset of the crisis the G-20 has reiterated the importance of a single high-quality 
accounting framework for the capital markets, and put special emphasis on the convergence 
between international accounting standards (IFRS) and US standards (US GAAP).
Worldwide, more than 100 countries apply IFRS. Nevertheless, convergence with the US 
accounting regulator is of particular importance. Since 2002 (Norwalk Agreement), both 
regulators have been working on a process of convergence which has reduced the 
differences between them, most notably in the areas of consolidation, fair value and post-
retirement employee benefits.
In 2010 the SEC made public its intention of considering the adoption of IFRS for US issuers. 
International companies listed on US markets can apply IFRS, just as companies listed in the 
EU can apply US GAAP. In May 2011 the SEC published various alternatives for the adoption 
of IRFS in the US: full direct application of IFRS or use of IFRS with some kind of approval 
process which might entail changes to the original standards. Most countries, including 
those of the EU, apply IFRS in this second way. In any case, the risk is that the SEC may end 
up adopting IFRS (principles) while at the same time retaining its guide lines (rules).
The final decision of the SEC on the adoption of IFRS has been postponed for the time 
being, and the conclusions reached to date are not definitive. Among other reasons, the 
SEC has emphasised the differing approaches of the two regulators involved: the FASB 
(US) with its detailed financial information regulation system characteristed by sector-
specific rules, as compared with the principles-based approach of the IASB (international) 
which does not have sector-specific rules but rather rules consistent with a broad 
conceptual framework.
Despite the efforts made, differences continue to exist between the FASB and the IASB, even 
in matters already revised by both of them. The differences in the banking sector are several.
There are various differences in the area of financial instruments, but both regulators are 
currently working to reduce them, so they may converge substantially in significant matters 
such as classification and measurement and the calculation of impairment. There are 
certain differences in the area of hedging, since under IFRS it is easier to use interest rate 
risk hedge accounting for both closed and open portfolios. This may be important for 
institutions which actively manage their interest rate risk. As regards the netting of assets 
and liabilities, the two regulators have agreed to maintain the differences and converge in 
reporting requirements. This matter is important in that it may give rise to differences in 
balance sheet size and hence affect certain matters such as the leverage ratio.
The crisis highlights the 
importance of a single 
accounting framework…
… and, in particular, 
the convergence 
of international 
accounting standards 
with US standards
Differences persist 
in various areas…
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Another significant difference arises in sale and lease back transactions in fixed assets. 
The treatment of these transactions under US GAAP hinders asset derecognition, giving 
rise to the deferral of P&L compared with IFRS.
A minor difference which does not affect valuation so much as balance sheet disclosure is 
the recognition of software. Software is classified as a fixed asset under US GAAP and as 
an intangible under IFRS. This difference would be insignificant if capital regulation 
standards recognised intangibles as assets, but they do not.
Goodwill impairment may also lead to significant differences. Under IFRS goodwill 
impairment is estimated on the basis of recoverable value, while under US GAAP it is 
measured using fair value, as if a new business combination were involved.
In any event, the cooperation between the accounting regulators continues and various 
joint projects are under way with the aim of achieving greater convergence between the 
two sets of standards. Efforts are currently focusing on accounting for financial instruments 
and finance leases and on revenue recognition.
Recent activity of the European Systemic Risk Board
The European Systemic Risk Board works to mitigate or prevent systemic risks which 
may jeopardise the stability of the EU financial system.1 By contrast, it has no direct 
competence in the area of crisis management and resolution. Therefore, the fact that this 
institution commenced operations in the thick of the economic crisis meant that it had to 
make a considerable effort to find a reasonable balance between its concern about 
materialised or imminent risks and its duty to carry out the medium- and long-term tasks 
at the core of its mandate.
Since it began operating in January 2011, the ESRB has been active in various areas, including 
the following: assessment of the macro-prudential implications of the current crisis; analysis 
aimed at detecting and prioritising potential medium- and long-term risks; development of a 
well-defined system of analytical tools, policy instruments and institutional frameworks 
appropriate for putting into practice effective macro-prudential policies; and, most notably, 
the adoption of decisions on the use of its main instruments (warnings and recommendations)2 
to signal and address potential risks to EU financial stability.
The ESRB’s most recent diagnosis of the main vulnerabilities of the EU financial system3 
pointed to a certain improvement in the financial market situation compared with the second 
half of 2011. It largely attributed this to the adoption of exceptional liquidity providing 
measures by the central banks (particularly the ECB tenders with full allotment for three-
year maturities), to the European agreements on public finances reached in December and 
to the progress of various countries in fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. This 
improvement has been reflected particularly in the moderation of the short-term tensions 
associated with the difficulties of the banking sector in raising funds on the wholesale 
markets. However, the ESRB stresses that the uncertainty is still very high and there are 
…although the regulators 
continue to cooperate
The aim of the European 
Systemic Risk Board is to 
mitigate or prevent systemic 
risks which may jeopardise 
the stability of the 
EU financial system
Since it commenced 
operations in January 2011, 
the ESRB has carried out 
various tasks ranging from 
analysis for detecting and 
prioritising potential risks 
to the issuance of warnings 
and recommendations
The ESRB has recently 
highlighted various 
vulnerabilities…
1  For an in-depth review of the structure, objectives and instruments of the ESRB, see Chapter 3 “The European 
Systemic Risk Board and macro-prudential oversight in Europe” of the November 2011 Financial Stability Report.
2  The ESRB’s policy tools are warnings and recommendations (which may in turn be public or confidential). 
Warnings call attention to potential risks to financial stability (without specifying specific action), whereas 
recommendations prescribe specific measures to address risks and set a schedule for applying them.
3  The latest meeting of the ESRB General Board  was on 22 March 2011.
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still significant risks derived from the potential negative interplay between various closely 
interrelated factors, such as i) the persistent misgivings about the sovereign debt of some 
euro area countries; ii) the pressure on private funding of the banking sector and the 
deleveraging of this sector (which in many cases is a natural correction of past excesses, 
but should not be done in a way that affects the supply of credit); and iii) the considerable 
downward revision of economic growth prospects.
Against this backdrop, the ESRB considered it important that governments should maintain 
their commitment to fiscal objectives and to structural reforms for boosting growth and 
that banks should take advantage of the recent relaxation of market tensions to continue 
strengthening their balance sheets and reduce their dependence on central bank measures 
to provide financing. Also, the ESRB emphasised the recent fall in cross-border financial 
activity, including within the euro area, as a result of which it has called on all public and 
private institutions to make an effort to safeguard the integrity of the Single Market. Lastly, 
the ESRB has indicated that, in addition to the risks already mentioned, it will examine 
more thoroughly the impact of the current economic weakness on credit risk and, in 
particular, on the effects of forbearance (changes in the contractual terms and conditions 
of potentially troubled loans), and that it will monitor the potential impact of the current 
conditions of high liquidity on risk aversion.
So far the ESRB’s work to assess the potential risks to EU financial stability has resulted in 
three public recommendations.4 The first, published in October 2011, focuses on the risks 
which may derive from lending in foreign currencies; while the other two, published in 
January 2012, relate to the risks associated with the dependence of certain EU financial 
institutions on US dollar denominated funding and the need for national macro-prudential 
authorities to have strong mandates. 
The first recommendation is on lending in foreign currencies to households and firms 
(mainly SMEs) which do not have adequate protection against foreign exchange risk.5 This 
lending exposes borrowers to foreign exchange market fluctuations, may give rise to 
significant credit and funding risks in the banking sector and, to the extent that it usually 
proliferates when interest rates are low, may contribute to excessive growth of credit in the 
overall economy. To prevent or mitigate these risks, the ESRB has proposed an extensive 
set of measures designed to achieve the following: raise borrowers’ awareness of the risks 
involved; ensure that these loans are only granted to sufficiently solvent borrowers; 
appropriately include the risks associated with this activity in credit institutions’ internal 
control systems; adopt more stringent capital requirements for loans of this type; monitor 
and limit the liquidity risks associated with this lending; and, finally, ensure reciprocity in 
the prudential measures adopted in this area, thereby impeding regulatory arbitrage.
The second recommendation is on the risks derived from US dollar denominated funding 
of a significant portion of the EU banking system. Most of the funding in this currency is 
short term and obtained from other banks and financial institutions, which contributes to 
its volatility. During the latest financial crisis, there have been major tensions in the financial 
markets for this currency, the systemic effects of which could have been significant. To 
avoid a recurrence of similar levels of tension in the future, the ESRB has issued two 
recommendations to national banking supervisors so they closely monitor US dollar 
…and made three public 
recommendations: on the risks 
derived from lending in foreign 
currencies; …
…on US dollar denominated 
funding of a significant portion 
of the EU banking system; …
4  The documentation relating to these recommendations is available at the following website: http://www.esrb.
europa.eu/recommendations/html/index.en.html.
5  In recent years, this type of loan has proliferated considerably in some EU countries, particularly in Eastern Europe.
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funding and liquidity risks and limit them if they reach excessive levels. Also, national 
supervisors are recommended to ensure that banks are ready to withstand potential 
shocks in US dollar funding and have contingency plans which expressly address this risk.
Lastly, the ESRB’s third recommendation focuses on the macro-prudential mandate of 
national authorities. This recommendation considers that, for macro-prudential policies to 
be effective in the EU, it is essential to designate national authorities with well-defined 
mandates, powers and instruments, taking into account also that the ESRB cannot directly 
use macro-prudential instruments and that its recommendations are not binding. The 
recommendation clearly sets out five principles which should be followed to ensure that 
the design of these mandates is effective:
1. A macro-prudential authority should be expressly designated with the 
mandate of safeguarding financial stability.
2. The specific characteristics of this authority may vary depending on each 
country’s traditions and institutional structure, although it is emphasised that, 
in any event, central banks should play a leading role, given their functions 
and capabilities in the areas of macroeconomic analysis and financial stability.
3. These authorities should have the information and instruments they need to 
identify and attempt to mitigate risks to financial stability.
4. Governance requirements based on transparency and accountability should 
be established.
5. The macro-prudential authority should be independent to ensure that it is 
shielded against pressures from private groups or political interests.
…and on the macro-prudential 
mandate of national 
authorities
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